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Questions perennially shroud the wedding in 1589 of Anna, princess of Denmark, 
and King James VI of Scotland. Less a single event than a protracted odyssey, it 
was marred by the unexpected and the dramatic: plan reversals, venue changes, 
and extraneous incidents (unseasonal storms, freak fatalities) that were regard-
ed even at the time as deeply portentous. In its wake came witchcraft trials, death 
sentences and damaged of icial reputations in both countries2 – and in time, a 
marriage that lost its bearings amidst strife and disillusion. At its outset lay a 
con luence of actions that similarly defy simple explanation: James’s sudden, late-
night sailing to meet Anna, who was waylaid in Norway; their wedding in Oslo a 
month later; and his overwintering in Scandinavia. 
Analysts have long puzzled over James’s precipitate actions. The question 
of motive lingers without apparent resolution. Here is a case of a young Scot-
tish king, whose position at home (much less his future on the English throne 
as Elizabeth I’s eventual successor) was potentially threatened by treasonous 
intrigues,3 who suddenly sets off across treacherous seas with ive stocked ships 
1 The author thanks the editors and two anonymous referees for insightful comments on an 
earlier draft.
2 Prosecution of the ‘North Berwick coven’ implicated Scotland’s ifth Earl of Bothwell for 
attempted murder. Renewed witch hunts commenced in 1597 and periodically resurfaced 
for decades. Proximate Danish trials drew in Danish Admiral Peder Munk and Christopher 
Valkendorf. Thomas Riis: Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot: Scottish-Danish Relations, c. 
1450-1707 (I), Odense: Odense University Press 1988, pp. 266-69.
3 The extent of James’s vulnerability is disputed. William Patterson: King James VI and the 
Reunion of Christendom, Cambridge: CUP 1997, pp. 13-14, points to furtive communications 
by Catholic-sympathizing Scottish nobles with King Philip II, courting a counter-Protestant, 
Spanish-led incursion well after the Armada’s defeat in August 1588. Some general studies 
concur (e.g. P. Hume Brown: A Short History of Scotland, new ed. by Henry W. Meikle, 
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd 1951, p. 217), holding he was “unable to keep order in the land”. 
Warnings from Queen Elizabeth about plots may corroborate such views, as does James’s 
banning of public demonstrations during his journey. Others dispute this, e.g. Caroline 
Bingham: James I of England, London: Weidenfeld 1981, p. 113. Subsequent quiescence 
suggests post-hoc evidence of wider stability; see Jennifer M. Brown: “Scottish Politics 1567-
1625”, in Alan G.R. Smith (ed.): The Reign of James VI and I, London: Macmillan 1973, p. 26.
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to the bleakness of wintertime Norway,4 evidently for the sole purpose of greet-
ing a young woman who, at any rate, would soon enough be coming to him. The 
voyage was physically risky, costly, hastily arranged, politically questionable and 
indeed unnecessary, given that the two had recently been married by proxy and 
were already formally united.
In fact, the journey presents a three-part puzzle: why James decided to go 
(rather than send Maitland of Thirlestane, his chancellor, as per the stated plan); 
what his precise purpose was (to ‘fetch’ Anna for their delayed Scottish wedding, 
or to marry in situ?); and why he readily scuttled the planned return to Scotland. 
Among other things, the episode appears seriously out of character. James was 
known for his retiring disposition, his excessive caution, his long-term strategiz-
ing, and his weakness for young men,5 a tendency apparently sustained from afar 
even during his post-wedding Danish layover.6 Yet his trip bears the hallmarks of 
conviction, resolution, even recklessness, including two serious breaches of royal 
protocol (landing unannounced on another sovereign’s territory, later trying to 
cross another’s without prior assent). His actions along the way speak further of 
unusual boldness, almost as if another person were involved. 
Explanations range widely, but tend to link James’s trip with an attempted 
resolution of a personal crisis. Permutations on this theme include escape from 
suffocating court pressures, fears for the safety of his missing bride, and an urge 
to end the rumor-mongering about his sexual orientation and ability, or willing-
ness, to sire a legitimate heir. Another relates to family heritage, with James, ever 
attendant to Stuart lore, emulating his grandfather, James V, who had sailed to 
France as a youngster to wed a foreign bride (Madeleine de Valois).7 Still another 
theory is that James felt honor-bound to act, having earlier pledged to the Scottish 
nobles he would marry within the year (1589) and thus end the tiresome, “will he 
or won’t he” marital speculation.
David Stevenson, author of the sole English-language monograph covering the 
wedding’s circumstances – but consciously sidestepping the Scandinavian con-
4 The initial message reaching James pronounced Norway, where Anna was stranded, as “a 
miserable place for victual or any good thing”; Ethel C. Williams: Anne of Denmark, London: 
Longman 1970, p. 18. His Norwegian experience included a frostbitten right index inger.
5 Philip Edwards: The Making of the Modern English State, 1460-1660, London: Palgrave 2000, 
p. 256; also Conrad Russell: The Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509-1660, London: 
OUP 1977, p. 258. 
6 In March 1590 James was busying himself with the question of (male) courtier access to his 
chambers; Amy L. Juhala: “Shifts and Continuities in the Scottish Royal Court, 1580-1603”, 
in David J. Parkinson (ed.): James VI and I, Literature and Scotland: Tides of Change, 1567-
1625, Leuven: Peeters 2013, p. 11.
7 These notions are broached respectively in Bingham: James I, pp. 118, 145; Williams: Anne 
of Denmark, p. 18; Alan Stewart: The Cradle King: A Life of James VI and I, London: Chatto and 
Windus, p. 111; and Gordon Donaldson: A Northern Commonwealth: Scotland and Norway, 
Edinburgh: Saltire 1990, p. 131. 
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text – holds it was “an irrational obsession (otherwise known as love) which led 
him to so dangerous an act … a folly explicable only by royal infatuation”.8 James 
biographer Alan Stewart attributes the king’s “fear of ridicule” stemming from 
his procrastination and cold feet.9 James himself gave colorful credence to this 
view, wishing “… that I be not unjustly slandered as an irresolute ass who can do 
nothing of himself”.10
The common denominator suggests actions in the heat of the moment, a hasty 
crisis response to unexpected circumstances. There is indeed ample evidence of 
emotionally driven, reactive behavior, including pre-departure accounts of an 
agi tated king, penning overwrought love-poems11 while keeping vigil, who “could 
neither sleep nor rest” due to acute anxiety.12 The resulting trip is frequently char-
acterized as odd or even bizarre,13 especially given his longstanding open doubts 
about marrying at all, and seen against the misogynistic elements later coloring 
his written works Daemologia and, more openly, Basilicon Doron. 
While the crisis-driven narrative may ring true, it nonetheless lacks the full 
ring of truth. Consigning the episode as exceptional or one-off behavior raises 
four problems. First, it makes James’s actions hard to measure against his over-
all life and reign, and does little to assess its relevance. This is a potentially seri-
ous problem given that this proved to be his one and only foreign trip (excluding 
England) in a reign spanning more than half a century, and moreover entailed a 
substantial, six-month chunk of time, which alone marks it out for scrutiny. It can 
also leave an erroneous impression of James as a lost and love-struck adolescent, 
rather than the shrewd sovereign of two decades’ standing he actually was. 
Second, it presents a convenient arti iciality that is hard to square with James 
the committed divine-righter, for whom the personal and professional were in-
extricably linked. The marriage itself was a state matter no less than a private 
one, and a negotiated affair to boot. Third, it leaves aside possible motivating fac-
tors of a proactive or forward-looking nature. And fourth, it underplays circum-
stances obtaining in the late 1580s, a transitional time for Scotland as well as 
8 David Stevenson: Scotland’s Last Royal Wedding: The Marriage of James VI and Anne of 
Denmark, Edinburgh: John Donald 1997, p. 28.
9 Stewart: The Cradle King, p. 111. In the backdrop was a childless Virgin Queen in London.
10 G.P.V. Akrigg (ed.): Letters of King James VI and I, Berkeley: University of California Press 
1984, p. 100.
11 James’s ‘Anna sonnets’, the irst of the Amatoria, have been characterized as “ostensibly 
nuptial sonnets [that] allegorize or ‘fabularize’ the sovereign voyage” and having an 
‘interpretive evasiveness’; see Sarah Dunningham: Eros and Poetry in the Courts of Mary 
Queen of Scots and James VI, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2002, pp. 83, 79. 
12 James Melville: Memoirs, Edinburgh 1752, p. 359.
13 Simon Adams twice refers to the trip as “bizarre” (“David Stevenson’s Scotland’s Last Royal 
Wedding”, Innis Review 49, 1997, p. 91) as does Stevenson (p. viii). Reviewing the same text, 
Alasdair MacDonald calls the May 1590 coronation “a bizarre ceremony” (Tijdschrift  voor 
Skandinavistiek, 1998, p. 112).
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James, with 1589 frequently pinpointed as a watershed year both in foreign and 
domestic policy. The absent-bride crisis of October 1589 poses a necessary but 
not suf icient condition for his going. A long-missing ingredient is a sense of wider 
context, while the notion that James’s journey may have had political or policy sig-
ni icance, or such factors of possible causation, is infrequently addressed. 
This article posits the trip as a window onto King James’s rule, priorities and 
character, and argues that complex considerations touching on matters of state – 
domestic politics (de ined broadly to cover England), trade issues and foreign pol-
icy, all with signi icant economic undercurrents – need factoring into the equa-
tion. Only by reconciling James VI the monarch with James the man can we see 
his actions as potentially revealing, rather than brushed away as inconveniently 
aberrant. These wider elements might point to ways out of the intellectual cul-de-
sac to which this episode has long and unfortunately been consigned by dint of its 
seeming strangeness. 
James’s journey into the heart of Scandinavia in the heart of winter – a sail to 
Norway, overland to Oslo, then south through Bohuslän, across a geopolitically 
sensitive east-west Swedish corridor,14 and over the Øresund to Denmark – mixed 
the personal elements of a wedding journey with an attempted rebooting of his 
diplomatic presence on the European stage. Up until then his focus was primar-
ily domestic. Several long-vexed issues – notably his relations with Elizabeth I, 
his ecumenical-cum-power struggles with the Kirk and the marital decision itself 
– had seen signi icant breakthroughs in the months just prior to his going. Much 
has been made of James’s cultural diplomacy in Denmark in spring 1590, nota-
bly calls on Tycho Brahe on Hven and Niels Hemmingsen at Roskilde. Yet analysts 
have overlooked the remarkable congruence of his six-week stay at Helsingør (El-
sinore), a strategic focal point for Baltic trade and the Scottish economy, and gen-
erally downplay the trip’s economic underpinnings – notwithstanding the im-
poverishment that drove so much of his overall decision making.
While the scope of this article is wide, its aims are limited. Drawing primarily 
on Scottish sources, it broaches questions left hanging by the plausibility gap and 
extends an exploratory inger at the broader political constellation in ways that 
may help illuminate the episode and the decisions involved. Insofar as the whole 
14 Bohuslän was Norwegian after the Kalmar Union’s breakup in 1503. Amidst the subsequent 
era of intra-regional rivalry, geopolitical repositioning and monarchical whim, Sweden 
maintained a “narrow strip of land between the Danish and Norwegian coastal provinces” 
that was “her only contact with the North Sea” (Ingvar Andersson: A History of Sweden, 
trans. Caroline Hannay, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1956, pp. 143-46, 161). This 
corridor was jealously guarded and often disputed. At least twice – in 1570 through the 
Treaty of Stettin, and in the 1612 Peace of Knäred – Sweden had to pay Denmark heavily to 
redeem the sea outlet and forti ications at Älvsborg, near Gothenburg. Along with Skåne 
(including Halland and Blekinge), Bornholm and Trøndelag, Bohuslän was later (1658) 
ceded to Sweden via the Roskilde Treaty. 
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affair has drawn sparse Scandinavian interest, European historians might ind 
fruitful elements looking through the opposite lens. For the marriage was a focal 
point of a broader rapprochement linking the Scottish and Danish courts, a match 
that both, for quite separate reasons, had actively sought.   
More speci ically, it posits the trip as a reputation-building exercise: a calcu-
lated risk serious enough to be worth taking only if it held out the prospect of sub-
stantial and long-term political and status enhancement, for James personally, his 
court, and Scotland. And for this its particular timing becomes a critical consid-
eration. Developments in 1588-89 had established for him a stronger, more inde-
pendent base, from which a bold move of some kind had suddenly become more 
possible, more likely, more appealing and potentially more impactful than per-
haps at any other time in his Scottish reign.
A central but rarely posed question is whether James went with the aim of 
ushering Anna back to wed in Scotland (the ‘fetch’ hypothesis) as long planned, 
or went with the expectation of marrying abroad. Analysts tend, unhelpfully, to 
muddle the distinction.15 But if, as is contended here, the latter was the case – that 
he traveled intending to marry and linger abroad, in apparent contravention of 
his recent dowry agreement with the Danish crown16 – then we must assume his 
trip involved an element of strategizing, forward planning and diplomatic sleight 
of hand. This reinforces the need to survey wider elements bearing on the role 
and person of James, particularly those that suggested opportunities, alongside 
the obvious risks, in setting out blindly to the wintry north.
MYSTERY ON PAPER
Part of the trip’s lingering mystery derives from James’s personal testament, os-
tensibly setting out his rationale for going.17 The lengthy letter, which he placed in 
the Privy Council Registry to be unveiled after his departure, appears soul-bar-
ing in its honesty, but also curiously incomplete. It strikes a de iant yet poignant 
note, underscoring personal travails like chronic solitude, his lack of a partner 
and a desire to silence his critics, without so much as mentioning Anna or love – 
notwithstanding the wistful letters and love-poems he was dashing off to her in 
15 Meikle, for example, says James “went to rendezvous with his bride” (“A Meddlesome 
Princess: Anne of Denmark in Scottish Court Politics, 1589-1603”, in Julian Goodare and 
Michael Lynch (ed.): The Reign of James VI, East Linton: Tuckwell Press 2000, p. 128), 
Caroline Bingham that he went “to bring her home” (The Stewart Kingdom of Scotland 1371-
1603, London 1974), p. 245, and Roger Mason that he went to “fetch his bride in person” 
(“Renaissance and Reformation”, in Jenny Wormold (ed.): Scotland: A History, Oxford: OUP, 
2005, p. 140). 
16 Under the dowry terms the Danes were responsible for the civil, proxy ceremony while the 
Scots would handle the subsequent religious service, presumably on home soil.
17 Akrigg (ed.): Letters, pp. 97-100.
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those same weeks.18 “The reasons were that I was alone, without father or moth-
er, brother or sister”, he wrote. “My nakedness made me weak and my enemies 
strong”. The intent to elicit public sympathy while diverting criticism was plain.
More speci ically to our purposes, his ‘confessional’ also alluded to “these rea-
sons and innumerable others, hourly objected”, factors pressing on him that he 
(typically) left unexplained. Further, it set out a trip timetable that was cryptical-
ly nuanced and which he later louted;19 and it referred to his decision to “hasten 
the treaty of my marriage”, without specifying which one he meant (proxy or re-
ligious) – a notable lapse, given that he was then between the two events. He also 
claimed that his going was a sudden, impetuous decision (“I, upon the instant, 
yea very moment, resolved”) even while leaving detailed instructions for running 
Scotland in his absence.20 Despite feverish speculation beforehand, he never ful-
ly revealed his intentions for a foreign wedding, much less a ive-month Europe-
an honeymoon.21 Yet that is what happened, so he evidently changed his mind at 
some point (and subsequently that of Anna and her handlers). It behooves us to 
ask why, considering the massive royal wedding then being actively orchestrat-
ed – and heavily taxed – for Edinburgh,22 and given his halfway, “formally but not 
fully married” status as of August 1589.
He also acknowledged that his trip went against character (“I am known … not 
to be intemperately rash”). It thus requires a leap of logic to accept that his actions 
– the surreptitious preparations, the late-night departure, the shotgun wedding 
in remote foreign territory – re lected spontaneous choices and ‘snap decisions’. 
Too much remains unexplained by such alleged dramatics; too much was at stake. 
At the time of going he was not just 23 – already rather ripe for royal betrothals – 
but (in Akrigg’s phrase) an ‘old young man’23 and crowned head of an unruly and 
impoverished kingdom; no rowdy princeling on gap year he.
His trip undoubtedly re lected a con luence of factors be itting a complex 
character. James VI/I has been called “one of the most complicated neurotics ever 
18 The best-known being “A complaint against the contrary Wyndes that hindered the Queene 
to com to Scotland from Denmarke”, in Neil Rhodes, Jenniffer Richards and Joseph Marshall 
(ed.): King James VI and I: Selected Writings, Archgate: Aldershot 2003, pp. 121-22.
19 His trip “shall be, God willing, within the space of 20 days, wind and weather serving”, two 
caveats adroitly distilled into one phrase.
20 Akrigg (ed.): Letters, p. 98. The Duke of Lennox was to run the Privy Council, with Bothwell 
seconded and Robert Bruce, a Kirk notable, as overseer. Tertiary roles were also speci ied.
21 James apparently informed the Privy Council on 17 October, two days before his planned 19 
October departure that was delayed for three days by storms; Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 
30.
22 Michael Lynch: “Court Ceremony and Ritual During the Personal Reign of James VI”, in 
Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch (ed.): The Reign of James VI, East Linton: Tuckwell Press 
2000, p. 88; Clara and Hardy Steeholm: James I of England: The Wisest Fool in Christendom, 
London: Michael Joseph 1938, pp. 115-16.
23 Akrigg (ed): Letters, p. 8.
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to sit on the English or Scottish thrones” and “one of the most secret princes of the 
world”.24 Prominent writers have underscored the paradox of his birth; even in 
death he was cryptic.25 His hatred of violence and love of the hunt is one of many 
apparent contradictions. He was also a proli ically agile writer, gifted linguist and 
occasional poet, arguably the most literate of all British monarchs, a Shakespear-
ean contemporary who presided over the immense King James Bible project.26 
A subtle and at times coldly strategic thinker whose overweening ambition was 
the English throne, he was eminently capable of juggling multiple concerns and 
obligations. He also had a record of leaving his subjects guessing his motives.27 
Sheer intellectual curiosity, an abundant and lifelong Jamesian trait, is oddly ab-
sent from most assessments of his journey. 
James was scarcely a naïf. Crowned at 13 months, he had witnessed ceaseless 
royal intrigue including, at ive, the murder of his grandfather the Earl of Len-
nox, later escaping a lengthy kidnapping ordeal (the Ruthven raids). He had been 
brought up, isolated in Stirling Castle, to be dubious of women as “a dangerous 
and distrustful phenomenon”.28 James (along with many others) evidently regard-
ed the question of an heir from a fundamentally political point of view, as a link 
in his wider calculations.29 Fast-spreading but ultimately false rumors, in March 
1590, of an Anna pregnancy well indicated the wider interest (and accompanying 
pressures) attaching to this question.30 Whatever his convoluted personal moti-
vations, these need to be slotted into the broader narrative of his reign.
Despite a fount of Stuart-age studies, multiple lacunae continue to mark re-
search into the Jacobean period. Goodare and Lynch cite a “black hole in our 
knowledge” of James’s middle Scottish phase, notably 1585-89.31 Post-1560 Scot-
tish foreign policy has drawn scant attention despite the looming importance of 
the English accession.32 Anna’s role is particularly neglected,33 with sourcing of-
ten reliant on Ethel Williams’s 1970 biography. Assessments have been marred by 
24 Akrigg: “Introduction”,  p. 3; Bingham: James VI, p. 152.
25 George Trevelyan called James “the comic offspring of [a] tragic union” (A Shortened Histo-
ry of England, London: Pelican 1970, pp. 277-78. A 19th century search for his Westminster 
Abbey grave, which had gone oddly unrecorded, found it in the tomb of Henry VII (Antonia 
Fraser: Mary, Queen of Scots, London: Panther 1971, p. 650).
26 Rhodes et. al.: “Introduction”, pp. 1-4.
27 Jane E.A. Dawson: Scotland Re-Formed, 1488-1587, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2007.
28 Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 13. 
29 James saw a dynastic heir as “a move on the chessboard of politics” (David Mathew: James I, 
London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1967, p. 44). 
30 Stewart: The Cradle King, p. 117.
31 Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch: “James VI: Universal King?”, in Goodare and Lynch (ed.): 
The Reign of James VI, East Linton: Tuckwell 2000, pp. 10-11.
32 Keith Brown: “Early Modern Scottish History: A Survey”, The Scottish Historical Review 
suppl. 234, 2013, pp. 7, 9-10, 23.
33 Meikle: “A Meddlesome”, p. 126.
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innuendo or invective (‘frivolous’ and even ‘stupid’ have been employed by main-
stream historians), while Anna’s patronage of the arts is often passed off as in-
fatuation with dancing and jewelry.34 Research by Maureen Meikle has assigned 
Anna a signi icant if meddlesome role in Scottish court politics,35 and her head-
strong nature was underscored later (ca. 1599) by her conversion to Catholicism. 
Her overall impact remains contentious but far from negligible. 
The wedding(s) itself has drawn “surprisingly little interest” from bio-
graphers,36 lummoxed perhaps by the fragmentary record and the story’s inher-
ent oddity. The event has left a faint and occasionally errant footprint in histories 
of Oslo and Norway.37 Stephenson’s monograph, featuring Peter Graves’s transla-
tion of a contemporaneous Danish account that was irst published in 1852,38 re-
solved some contentious details, such as the ceremony’s location39 and relevant 
dates.40 It did less to counter a certain prejudicial overhang in British historiog-
raphy, including erroneous impressions of a dissolute Danish royal family rather 
than the powerfully competent purveyors of great-power politics who wielded 
political primacy in Scandinavia.41 James’s own correspondence can leave an im-
pression of a sybaritic, alcohol-besotted interlude, rather than one that stood to 
strengthen his, and Scotland’s, cultural, dynastic, and potentially economic and 
political standing. Another reason for the analytical caution, or subject-avoid-
34 Akrigg: “Introduction”, p. 19; Alan G.R. Smith: The Reign of James VI and I, London: 
Macmillan 1973, p. 3; Meikle: ‘A Meddlesome’, pp. 126-7. Through patronage of Inigo Jones, 
an impresario with links in both countries, Anne introduced the allegorical, Jacobean 
masque-based Italian performance art into court life; Lawrence Stone: The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy 1558-1641, Oxford: Clarendon 1965, p. 709.
35 Meikle: “A Meddlesome”, pp. 126-140.
36 Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. vii.
37 An otherwise authoritative compendium dates the wedding 19 November and gives Anna’s 
original departure city as Oslo not Copenhagen; N.P.  Thuesen: Historien om Oslo: år for år, 
Oslo 2010, p. 93. The 15-volume Norges Historie (Bind 6 av Rolf Fladby, Oslo: J.W. Cappelens 
Forlag 1977, p. 315) more correctly calls it the (royal) marriage of Norway’s century.
38 “The Danish Account of the Marriage”, translated by Peter Graves, in Stevenson: Scotland’s 
Last, pp. 79-122. According to Stevenson, the Danish account was found in the 18th century 
in Oslo and published by P.A. Munch in 1852, based on an 18th century copy in Ledreborg.
39 Many sources (Bryan Bevan: King James VI and I. London: Rubicon Press 1996, p. 42; 
Williams: Anne of Denmark, p. 18; Bingham: James VI, pp. 121-22) have put the venue as 
St. Halvard’s Cathedral, long connected by walkway to the actual venue, the Old Bishop’s 
Palace (‘Kristen Mule’s House’, later the Ladegård).
40 In the late 16th and early 17th centuries Britain adhered to the Julian calendar, while most of 
Europe had switched to the Gregorian, ten days ahead. Patterson: King James VI, p. xv.
41 Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 17, cites the common (non-Danish) view that heavy drink 
shortened the life of Anna’s father, King Frederick II. Recent research however proposes 
lung ailments as the main factor behind James’s father-in-law’s death in 1588 (c.f. Poul 
Grinder-Hansen: Frederik II: Danmarks Renæssancekonge, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 2013, 
301-04). The author is indebted to both reviewers on this point. James himself noted, in a 
letter (19 Feb.) to Bruce, the need “to keep decorum to, coming out of so drinking a country 
as this” (Akrigg (ed.); Letters, p. 104). 
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ance, may be that the trip’s readily romanticized elements it awkwardly with the 
sober preoccupations of social science.
THE BACKGROUND
The James-Anna union slots into an Anglo-Nordic nexus with deep roots in early 
Norse raids, the Danelag and King Cnut. These were later strengthened by instru-
ments of statecraft as well as through organic ties of migratory settlement and trade. 
No less than ive different igures from the 13th to 18th centuries attained dynas-
tic supremacy in royal houses across the North Sea.42 England’s Stuart Age, which 
transplanted Scottish royalty to London, united the two crowns and gave birth to 
Britain, was actually bookended by Danish royal consorts.43 Each contained ele-
ments of political association and broached lingering territorial issues related to the 
Shetlands and Orkneys island groups, lost to Scotland in 1469 via an unredeemed 
dowry.44 Yet all yielded little of substance, apart from highlighting ancestral ties.45 
The marriage was nearly a decade in the making, with feelers put out as early 
as 1582. A renewed Danish overture to Scotland, in 1585, hinged partly on win-
ning back the Shetlands and Orkneys, though some doubt this was King Freder-
ick’s sole purpose.46 Another latent Danish aim may have been to strengthen in-
luence in England – a far bigger prize – by way of James and Scotland. Intense 
16th century rivalries with Sweden, punctuated by the bloody Northern Seven 
Years’ War (1563-70), also strongly suggest intra-Scandinavian rivalry as a key 
– particularly as Swedish King Erik XIV, in mid-century, had assiduously courted 
England’s Elizabeth I for marriage. An ef icient Danish diplomatic network would 
certainly have known of James’s position as her putative successor. Both sides 
recognized the value of a Protestant alliance, even though Norway-Denmark’s 
Reformation was both earlier (1537 vs. 1560) and more decisive than in Britain.47 
42 Anna’s predecessors included Margaret of Scotland, who married Erik II, king of Norway, 
in 1281 to patch up Scots-Norwegian relations; their daughter Margaret, “Maid of Norway”, 
presumptive queen of Scotland only to die, aged seven, while en route; and Margaret of 
Denmark, who married James III and became queen of Scotland in 1469. 
43 Anna became England’s queen consort in 1603, while a century later another Queen Anne, 
married to Jørgen (George) of Denmark, ushered in the Hanoverian line.
44 In 1468 Denmark’s King Christian I pledged the Orkneys as dowry security for his daughter 
Margaret. As it was never paid the islands were thus ‘pawned’ to Scotland, and quickly 
assimilated; See W.P.I. Thomson: The New History of Orkney, Edinburgh: Birlin 2008, p. 189. 
The Scots hoped for acknowledgement of the status quo, the Danes latching onto hopes of 
their redemption. For background see I. Steinar: “The Scottish-Norwegian Border in the 
Middle Ages”, in A. Wolf (ed.): Scandinavia-Scotland-Twenty Years After, St Andrews 2009, p. 22.
45 Anna’s coronation processional juxtaposed images of heraldry, “tracing the consanguinity” of 
the two royal houses since Margaret and James III in 1469; Lynch: “Court Ceremony”, pp. 86-7. 
46 Adams: “David Stevenson’s”, p. 91.
47 In Britain the ‘Long Reformation’ suggested bottom-up as well as top-down processes; 
Karen Bowie: “Cultural, British and Global Themes in the History of Early Medieval 
Scotland”, The Scottish Historical Review suppl. no. 234, 2013, p. 40. 
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Early Scottish overtures to Spain and, subsequently, to Huguenot France and 
Catherine, daughter of Henry II of Navarre (and Elizabeth I’s preferred solution) 
were cast aside in favor of Lutheran Denmark. The Danes also offered physical 
proximity, substantial north European in luence,48 and a signi icant if imprecise 
source of outside wealth. Brie ly, it also offered choice and fecundity; Anna and 
her sister Elisabeth were both, unlike Catherine, younger than James.
Only in early 1589 did James feel compelled to decide – after, it is said, 15 
days of seclusion and prayer. A shadowy igure and probable Danish spy, William 
Stewart, instrumentally secured the decision. Even then, preparations dragged. 
In mid-June a convoy, led by George Keith, the ifth Earl Marischal, inally left for 
Copenhagen to negotiate the marriage terms. The possibility of failure, and un-
certainty over Queen Elizabeth’s attitude, could explain why James continued to 
cultivate the Navarre option until late in the day.
The negotiations commenced with extravagant Scottish demands that were 
immediately whittled down. These included a dowry of 250,000 daler; recipro-
cal freedoms for Scots in Denmark and vice versa; exemption from Danish cus-
toms duties by Scots trading ships; standing promises of military aid to Scotland 
if circumstances required (at Danish expense); renunciation of claims over the 
Orkneys while either king was alive; and a mutual promise of anti-Catholic alli-
ance should either country be threatened.49 Some of this built on previous mutu-
ally agreed rights in trade and asylum. 
The Danes’ counteroffer was just 75,000 daler50 and broader political over-
tures were cut off citing the ongoing regency and matters “customary since an-
cient times”. In return they requested properties worth double the dowry’s valua-
tion (thus 150,000 daler), along with rights of religious leeway and nulli ication.51 
By August “a marriage has been arranged” in broad conformity with Danish wish-
es. At the Kronborg ceremony Marischal, representing James, presented Anna 
with jewels and symbolically entered the bed-chamber. The property agreement, 
giving her Linlithgow palace, Falkland castle, and one-third of his Scottish prop-
erties, however remained a point of contention (as James resisted putting a mon-
etary amount on the last-mentioned), and in Oslo he was also to stump up an ad-
ditional ‘morning gift’, the Lordship of Dunfermline, partly in response to Danish 
insistence that the property matter be clari ied in Norway.52
48 Danish territory then included Norway, southern Sweden (excepting the corridor) and 
northern Germany. On the latter’s importance, see Patterson: King James VI, p. 90.
49 “The Danish”, pp. 79-80. 
50 This was equivalent to 100,000 guilder or a barrel of gold.
51 “The Danish”, pp. 82-3.
52 Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 37; R.S. Brydon: The Finances of James VI, 1567-1603, University 
of Edinburgh, PhD Dissertation, 1925, p. 60.
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THE TRIP IN BRIEF
The trip’s outline has been described elsewhere.53 Anna, departing on 5 September 
aboard the Gideon, ran into unseasonable storms. Springing leaks, the 16-ship con-
voy was blown back, beached at Gammel Sellohe in Norway, patched up and tried 
again. Several ships (including hers) sprang more leaks, and the effort was aban-
doned at Flekkerø around 1 October. A shaken Anna was advised to return to Den-
mark, by land. Meanwhile James got word of her travails while at Craigmillar Castle, 
penned agonized verse and called for a public fast for her safe deliverance. Around 
10 October he received de inite word that she was in Norway. His chancellor, Mait-
land, was engaged to go intercept them. James at some point decided (or was con-
vinced) to go along, leaving his plans vague, and the lotilla left late on 22 October.54 
He landed (29 October)55 in Flekkerø, overnighting at the same farmhouse 
where Anna had stayed a month earlier. His party traveled to Oslo via Tønsberg, 
covering 200 miles (ca. 300 kilometers) in two weeks. The two inally met on 19 
November at the Old Bishop’s Palace, James marching in with muddy boots and 
attempting to kiss Anna in the Scottish way. After initial confusion they appar-
ently bonded, held a longer session the following day, and arranged a wedding for 
the 23rd in the same venue. A simple service, in French, was led by Scots chaplain 
David Lindsay, and after a modest reception (probably at Akershus fortress, 2 km 
across Bjørvik jord), the couple remained in Oslo for a month. 
The original plan had James returning forthwith to Scotland. Two things ap-
pear to have changed his mind: Anna’s traumatic earlier voyage and the caution 
of advisors in both courts. By now if not before, James was determined to stay 
on.56 Meanwhile Queen Sophia had proferred an invitation, and on 22 December 
the couple left for Denmark. A series of delays, due to weather and Anna’s illness, 
were complicated by miscommunications that left Sweden’s King Johan III unin-
formed about their plan to cross the Swedish corridor. James personally broke the 
week-long impasse by dispatching an envoy, Captain Murray, to obtain safe pas-
sage, averting a diplomatic row.57 They arrived, on 21 January to a blaze of fan-
fare, in Helsingør, where they were based until early March. Travels ultimately 
took them to Copenhagen. In late April they attended the marriage of Elisabeth, 
Anna’s sister, to the Duke of Brunswick before setting sail, meeting storms of less-
53 Sources include Bingham: James VI, pp. 112-26; Williams: Anne of Denmark, pp. 11-25; 
Antonia Fraser: King James VI of Scotland, I of England, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
1974, pp. 51-5;  Steeholm: James I, pp. 104-31; Stewart: The Cradle King, pp. 105-23; Akrigg 
(ed.): Letters, pp. 94-102; and Stevenson: Scotland’s Last; “The Danish”, pp. 86-99.
54 “Little by little … his Majesty was moved to take the voyage himself”; Melville: Memoirs, p. 361. 
55 “The Danish” (p. 90) indicates 3 November.
56 Melville’s account says “he could not be persuaded to return to Scotland” (Memoirs, p. 362). 
57 Mentioned brie ly in the Danish Account (p. 97), the Bohus incident is discussed in 
Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, pp. 41-3. 
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er intensity, arriving with due pomp in Scotland, where an elaborate coronation 
took place on 17 May.
A DOMESTIC TURNING POINT
James was long preoccupied with his position at home. Shoring it up was a deli-
cate, continual process complicated by his youth, absence of a nuclear family and 
his shaky political relations, not just across the border with Elizabeth I but with 
power rivals in the Kirk – some of whom presumed to represent highest temporal 
authority – and the gentri ied, noisily assertive Scottish nobility. The four-estate 
Parliament was an active deliberative body and decidedly no direct instrument 
of the crown.58 
Amidst this uncertain matrix came a breakthrough via an alliance with Pres-
byterians in 1589, which addressed his reign’s most intractable political prob-
lem and turned them, especially the poet Andrew Melville, from opposition to 
establishment igures.59 This agreement bolstered a tenuous peace James had 
managed, against great odds, by the late 1580s,60 although it is sometimes inter-
preted narrowly as reduced tensions.61 As a watershed it remains tarnished by 
its temporariness and abrupt termination in 1596. James nonetheless had proved 
skillful and “more and more in control of his turbulent kingdom”.62 The stum-
bling-block posed by his long-unresolved marital status, in contrast, required de-
cisiveness of a personal nature.
A related process was the cultural awakening and post-Reformation nation-
building then underway.63 This process was heralded in a seminal 1582 text (Re-
rum Scoticarum Historia) by George Buchanan, James’s in luential irst tutor (and 
proponent of elective monarchy). Radical politics aside, this work came to signify 
a ‘self-fashioning’ for Scotland while serving up cultural reassurance for a coun-
try and people facing an uncertain, post-Elizabethan future.64 This cultural low-
ering, embracing poetry, art and mapmaking, had heady, messianic overtones 
58 Alan R. MacDonald: “Deliberative Processes in Parliament c. 1567-1639: Multicameralism 
and the Lords of the Articles”, The Scottish Historical Review 131, 2002, p. 45.
59 Paul J. McGinnis and Arthur H. Williamson: “Politics, Prophecy, Poetry: The Melvillian 
Moment, 1589-96, and its Aftermath”, The Scottish Historical Review 227, 2010, p. 11.
60 “James… made a unique contribution to the growth of order”; Gordon Donaldson: Scotland: 
The Shaping of a Nation, Newton Abbot: David and Charles 1980, p. 80.
61 Goodare cites a “temporary political consensus – or perhaps a lull in the intensity of factual 
con lict [in Scotland]”; “Scottish Politics in the Reign of James VI”, in Julian Goodare and 
Michael Lynch (ed.): The Reign of James VI, East Linton: Tuckwell Press 2000,  p. 38.
62 Akrigg: “Introduction”, p. 8.
63 Scotland’s Renaissance “… transformed the manners and mores of the landed elite” through 
humanist education; Mason: “Renaissance”, p. 141.
64 Roger A. Mason: ‘Certeine Matters Concerning the Realm of Scotland: George Buchanan and 
the Scottish Self-Fashioning at the Union of the Crowns’, The Scottish Historical Review 233, 
2013, pp. 61-2.
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that “fueled hope, expanded vision and made Scotland integral to the crusade for 
world reform, perhaps its new and decisive launching pad” by decade’s end.65 The 
ecumenical universalism of James’s later worldview found roots in such theoreti-
cal agitation.
Cultural self-awareness thus became linked to developments exogenous to the 
Scottish realm, and was more grounded than fringe notions of a Protestant apoca-
lyptic. Politically, James’s engineered order at home was linked, in one view, to an 
educational propensity, a pedantic eagerness “to teach his Scottish subjects [and] 
raise their standards to those of ‘other well governed commonwealths’”.66 Joining 
with the established Danish crown was one obvious manifestation.67 James during 
his trip proved an assiduous student of the Danish monarchy, which he admired 
for its ability to manage the aristocracy. Earlier correspondence between Buchan-
an and Brahe (acknowledged by James on his day-trip to Hven)68 showed these 
cultural networks ran far deeper than royal ties alone, and included prominent 
thinkers like Niels Krag, Peter Young and Nicholaus Theophilus.69 Intellectual con-
tact between the two countries peaked during Christian IV’s regency (1588-96).70
A third contextual element involved the prospect of union with England, her-
alded since James IV and Margaret Tudor’s marriage in 1503, but left hanging by 
Elizabeth’s refusal to name a successor. Since the 1586 Treaty of Berwick, the 
widespread but unspoken assumption marked James as heir apparent. This re-
mained the case through the traumas that saw Elizabeth condemn and execute 
Mary Queen of Scots, James’s mother, in early 1587, over his muted protests. 
James’s path was then clearer yet still narrow, between keeping her con idence 
and asserting independence. James’s opting for a Danish union, nudged by his 
court, helped to distance him from Elizabeth without sowing rancor. The mar-
riage deal, to which she latterly assented, potently demonstrated his enhanced 
sense of autonomy.
THE QUESTION OF FINANCE
The parlous state of court and Scottish inances was an irritating (and partly self-
generated) constant in James’s reign, and underlay virtually all his policy initia-
tives, though it has generated few targeted studies.71 While often attributed to 
65 McGinnis and Williamson: “Politics”, p. 11; Mason: “Certeine Matters”, p. 57. 
66 Donaldson: Scotland, p. 80.
67 Mason: “Renaissance”, p. 140.
68 Stewart: The Cradle King, p. 115. James had broken with Buchanan over divine right.
69 Riis: Should Auld, pp. 124-29.
70 Riis: Should Auld, p. 137.
71 An exception is S.G.E. Lythe: The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625, 
Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1960. 
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Anna, a foreign consort anxious to impress,72 it was a preexisting if hard-to-de-
termine reality. Two elements came to characterize it. One was the emergence, 
under James, of major taxation in peacetime.73 Another was a shaky dependency 
on Elizabethan goodwill, in the form of payments from London starting in 1586. 
As Goodare has shown, this was no annual allowance, as commonly assumed, but 
an intentionally irregular series of payments that accounted for roughly a ifth of 
James’s income.74 
The pecuniary imperatives of James’s six-month trip re lected the fundamen-
tally economic driving force behind the marital agreement itself. In spring 1589 
local politics were animated by feared economic consequences if the proposed 
Danish marriage fell through. A turning point came in late May, via threats from 
the burghs brought against James’s chancellor, Maitland, for allegedly trying to 
scuttle the Danish marriage.75 This event seems to have catalyzed efforts to inal-
ize the union.76
The subsequent dowry to-and-fro, negotiated in Copenhagen, laid bare Scot-
land’s poor economic state, where revenue-raising was a chronically tough task.77 
A convention of Scottish estates in April 1588 had voted a special marriage levy 
(100,000 pounds), topped up in August 1589 by a 20,000-pound loan from the 
burghs.78 Despite this, wedding preparations were running far behind. James had 
had to “beg and even threaten the landed men of Scotland to supply victuals and 
furnishing”,79 yet supplies were awaiting delivery, while castle upgrading was 
short of hopes. Queen Elizabeth donated 2,000 pounds’ worth of silver – but held 
back her formal approval of the match until September, when it was a fait accompli. 
The high spirits brie ly sparked by the marital pact, dampened by the wed-
ding disarray, were dashed by late September 1589 as James got word, via Lord 
Dingwall, of Anna’s seaborne dramas. In straitened circumstances, setting off to 
72 In the mid-1590s James was forced into an internal audit (by the ‘Octavians’) which he 
subsequently undermined; Juhala: “Shifts and Continuities”, pp. 10-11. 
73 Michael Lynch: Scotland: A New History, London: Century 1991, p. 236.
74 Julian Goodare: “James VI’s English Subsidy”, in J. Goodare and M. Lynch (ed.): The Reign 
of James VI, East Linton: Tuckwell Press 2000), believes the sums were varied to sow 
uncertainty, enabling Elizabeth “to buy him cheap” (p. 125). James received about 3,000 
English pounds per year or roughly 30,000 Scots.
75 That day burgesses and of icials cornered Thirlestane in his chambers, apparently 
threatening death if the Danish marriage was scuttled; Stewart: The Cradle King, p. 107; 
Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 15. .James later also blamed Thirlestane, along with “others 
of his council as had plainly voted against the said marriage”; James Melville: Memoirs, 
Edinburgh 1752, p. 359.
76 A day before the May 28 riot, Marischal had dismissed his two ships readied to sail for 
Denmark, ironically just as a Danish envoy was arriving to ascertain the delay. These were 
hastily reassembled and departed three weeks later.
77 Bowie: “Cultural, British”, p. 41.
78 Lynch: “Court Ceremony”, pp. 86-7.
79 Meikle: “A Meddlesome”, p. 129.
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intercept Anna makes far more sense if it accompanied expectations that the ac-
tual wedding could take place abroad, and seen done on his own initiative. Ste-
venson plausibly suggests that James had this eventuality in mind, along with as-
sociated cost savings.80 Brydon attributed James’s anxiety to go and stay away to 
his being “very clearly ashamed of his poverty”,81 suggesting a touchiness to his 
penury. By now he would have heard of elaborate preparations in Copenhagen, in-
cluding 300 seamstresses sewing the wedding gown.
Edinburgh also awaited two other, extravagant related events – a royal entry 
combined with a coronation, not seen there since 1503, and a prospective bap-
tism of a putative heir to James – both of which would require funding. James had 
showed himself to be an agile gift-switcher regarding Elizabethan largesse,82 but 
this was a poor substitute for true economies. Those (coronation) plans, it later 
happened, were delayed, underfunded and criticized by some nobles as chaotic.83
Scotland’s domestic economy was marked by structural impediments includ-
ing sectoral rigidity, rudimentary technology and lack of risk capital – in Tre-
velyan’s arched phrase “a land of feudal anarchy” untouched by Europe’s pre-in-
dustrial craft guilds.84 Heavily rural-based, it was also dominated by monopolies 
distributed from the crown. Post-civil war, growth remained sluggish, with a 
growing urban underclass. These socio-economic woes were exacerbated by 
currency debasements (under royal iat), and lost income due to secularization 
of church lands.85 Even needed basics like salt were sold abroad. A “serious sub-
sistence crisis” of unseasonable cold and agricultural shortfalls, of famine and 
plague,86 punctuated a scenario both intractable and dismal.
James did enjoy a temporary reprieve that may have induced a leetingly per-
sonal relief. Goodare’s analysis indicates 1589 as an unusually lush year – partly 
in thanks for James’s support for fending off the Armada – with Elizabeth mak-
80 “Did they [the Danish council] suspect that one of his motives for coming had been to avoid 
paying for his own marriage? If so, it is possible that they were right”; Stevenson: Scotland’s 
Last, p. 36.
81 Brydon: The Finances, pp. 64, 66-7. The tax monies paid for basic palace refurbishment and 
repair, mostly while he was away in Scandinavia. 
82 Before leaving Oslo (22 December) James gave Bishop Jens Nilssøn two gilded silver 
plates supplied by Elizabeth. Steen Brahe, Axel Gyldenstierne and Maitland were other 
bene iciaries; Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 39. Earlier, Elizabethan funds had paid for 
Marischal’s trip to negotiate the dowry. Her dismay over such practices reinforced a desire 
to monitor how her subsidies were spent; see Goodare: “James VI’s English Subsidy”, p. 121.
83 Upon arrival in Scotland, Anna laid up at King’s Wark in Leith for ive days while Holyrood 
Palace was itted out; the Danes supplied the royal carriage as none was available in 
Scotland. Lynch: ‘Court Ceremony’, pp. 83-4, 87.
84 Trevelyan: A Shortened, 238.
85 Dawson: Scotland Re-Formed, pp. 287-91; Lythe: The Economy, p. 188; S.G.E. Lythe: “The 
Economy of Scotland under James VI and I”, in Alan G.R. Smith (ed.): The Reign of James VI 
and I, London: Macmillan 1973, pp. 67-9.
86 Dawson: Scotland Re-Formed, pp. 322-23.
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ing two separate payments to James, 3,000 English pounds in May and again in 
September,87 apart from the 2,000-pound wedding gift. This minor windfall, set 
against Scotland’s chronic economic weakness and mismanaged wedding-tax 
hikes, gives a nuanced picture of his pecuniary circumstances that could help ex-
plain his alacrity in exiting Scotland in October 1589.
Evidence that James promised Dunfermline Abbey to Anna at their irst or 
second meeting at Mule’s house also strengthens arguments for prior intent 
based on economic consideration.88 James’s initially large supporting cast in Oslo 
was cut sharply back after the wedding, leaving a retinue of 40-50.89 Niggling i-
nancial issues cropped up frequently during his months abroad and animated 
his chief advisors.90 Pressure abated in February 1590 when Queen Sophia gave 
James 20,000 pounds Scots additional to the dowry, presumably to cover his ex-
penses in Denmark.
FOREIGN AND TRADE ISSUES
External relations had likewise reached a turning point in 1589. Scottish foreign 
policy under James is generally regarded as low priority,91 and like inance has 
been studied intermittently. One reason is surely James’s aversion to the military 
adventurism otherwise fundamental to post-Reformation European politics; an-
other is Scotland’s uncertain status as an English client-state. James’s few initia-
tives proved ill-conceived. In keeping with the ‘Auld Alliance’, France was an ear-
ly focal point, having produced an in luential advisor and his irst intimate, Esmé 
Stuart; James’s irst language was in fact French. 92 Yet the link was attenuating by 
a passing generation (his mother Mary had brie ly been queen of France) and the 
confessional fracture of the Reformation.93 
James, a staunch Calvinist, curried favor with France, Philip II’s Spain, and the 
Pope, all in vain hopes of inancial reward for showing leniency toward Catholics. 
James’s foreign policy has been directly attributed to the crown’s extreme pover-
ty.94 Post-Armada, his fumbling efforts to play England and France against each 
other similarly came to naught; Elizabeth retained Henry of Navarre, now king 
87 Goodare: “James VI’s English Subsidy”, pp. 114-15.
88 Steeholm: James I, p. 122; Meikle: “A Meddlesome”, p. 130; Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 36.
89 Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, p. 38.
90 Maitland, dependent on royal favor, had advocated a quick return to Scotland, James at irst 
leaned toward a low-key stayover in Oslo; Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, pp. 36-9. Uncertain 
burden-sharing along with anticipated costs complicated matters; Melville (Memoirs, p. 
363) mentions “their continual janglings, strife, pride and partialities” that produced two 
hostile factions while in Denmark. 
91 Mathew: James I, p. 6.
92 Bingham: James VI, p. 41. He wrote to Anna in French, the language of their wedding 
service.
93 Mathew: James I, pp. 1-4.
94 Brydon: The Finances, p. 186.
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of France, as an ally. Imperial Spain agitated learned debate in Scotland and lat-
er igured hugely in James’s foreign overtures, yet like France, he never set foot 
there. Franco-Spanish rivalry nonetheless promoted English-Scottish rapproche-
ment and paved the way for James’s later assumption of the combined throne.95
Pursuit of the Danish link had similar pecuniary basis but held wider impor-
tance for Scotland, in two respects. One was agitation by merchants to secure 
stronger access to Baltic trade routes, making it an economic question for Scot-
land and not just a matter of crown inance. A second involved James’s dreams 
of a uni ied Christian community, in which Lutheranism would represent an im-
portant ecumenical link. Moreover both the trade and cultural/religious strands 
were amenable to personal interventions. By putting a personal stamp on the 
Danish link, James could further distance himself from Elizabeth who, despite 
endless European power machinations, never left English soil. After his return, 
James attempted to capitalize on his links with Christian IV to push his European 
peace project, with limited success.96 
The foreign backdrop assumes added signi icance when coupled with Scot-
tish trade policy that was rapidly reorienting toward the Baltic. Reliance on for-
eign trade created a vulnerability bordering on dependence on developments as 
far a ield as Danzig and La Rochelle, 97 though it sustained Borders ports like Ber-
wick-upon-Tweed. Domestically, the Convention of the Royal Burghs kept a tight 
grip on trade policy, which was later (1597) extended to include an ad valorem tax 
on imports, a plainly iscal (revenue-enhancing) measure rather than a commer-
cial-based one.98
Scottish trade then had four foci: Norway, Western France, the Low Coun-
tries and the Baltic, two of the four thus being broadly Nordic. Vital goods lowed 
in both directions.99 A breakdown of ship arrivals in Dundee between 1580 and 
1618 shows more than half (259 of 483) from Baltic or Scandinavian ports.100 
The Baltic was a crucial granary, especially rye, for Scotland given periodic food 
shortages. The years 1586-87 brought one such shortfall (after another in 1575-
78), and Scottish exports of skins and salt to the Baltic notably rose in those years. 
From roughly 1580 the connection broadened to the Baltic proper and eastern 
95 Trevelyan: A Shortened History, pp. 236-37.
96 Patterson: King James VI, p. 192.
97 S.G.E. Lythe: “The Economy of Scotland under James VI and I”, in Alan G.R. Smith (ed.): The 
Reign of James VI and I, London: Macmillan 1973, pp. 72, 59.
98 Lythe: “The Economy”, pp. 58-66.
99 Scottish traders took hides, leather, cloth, salt, cured ish and coal; they received corn, 
lax, hemp, and forestry products e.g. tar and pitch; from about 1580, when trade with 
Stockholm grew, they also imported iron and copper from Sweden. Timber from Norway 
was a mainstay for denuded eastern Scotland. Scotland for Baltic traders, in contrast, 
remained comparatively marginal.
100  Lythe: “The Economy”, pp. 68-9.
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Sweden. Still another factor was the growing Scottish diaspora in the Baltic, es-
pecially Poland.101
Of special interest is the intervention James made with Elizabeth on behalf of 
one George Mar, a mayor of Helsingør, in April 1590, just before leaving Denmark. 
The king arranged for the Scots merchant, normally a salt trader, to export 1,200 
cloths duty-free to Denmark.102 It is a rare but telling indication that Helsingør for 
James was a place of attention and involvement.
Since Erik of Pomerania probably around 1429,103 the Danish crown had con-
trolled the Sound  which involved paying levies and made Helsingør, at the choke-
point, a ‘compulsory call’ for passing ships.104 The Great Belt (Store Bælt), another 
Baltic entryway, was also in Danish hands. For all its later Shakespearean over-
tones, the town’s principal importance then lay in the more mundane context of 
regional commerce, a link detailed by Riis.105 Studies of Baltic commerce tend to 
focus on Dutch preeminence,106 but it was utterly central to the English as well as 
Scottish economy.107 Shipbuilders relied on organic products like tar, hemp and 
timber from the Baltic.108
Several writers have shown that customs tolls weighed on of icial Scotland 
in the 1580s – in terms of domestic policy109 and speci ically regarding Denmark 
and the Sound. Since mid-century the Scots had fruitlessly lobbied the Danes to 
eliminate a troublesome (one percent) ad valorem duty charged to Scottish prod-
ucts passing through the Sound, which had possibly been linked to the Orkneys 
issue; the point resurfaced in the 1589 dowry negotiations. Since their 1469 trea-
ty, mutual free movement was guaranteed between Scots and Danes, but now 
contingent on paying tolls. 
101  D. Armitage: “The Scottish Diaspora”, in Jenny Wormald (ed.): Scotland: A History, Oxford 
2005, p. 278. Scottish traders in Poland were so prevalent that traveling pedlars were 
nicknamed ‘Scots’; Dawson: Scotland Re-Formed, 287.
102  Calendar of State Papers Relating to Scotland, 1509-1603, London: 1885, p. 573; Riis: Should 
Auld (II), p. 234; Stevenson: Scotland’s Last, 53.
103  Thomas Riis: “Elsinore,” in Byron J. Nyrdstrom (ed.): Dictionary of Scandinavian History, 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986, 160-62; Jens E. Olesen: “Inter-Scandinavian 
Relations”, in Knut Helle (ed.): The Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Cambridge: CUP 
2003, p. 730. 
104  Riis: Should Auld, p. 68.
105  Riis: Should Auld, pp. 150-99.
106  David Kirby: Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1492-1772, 
London: Longman 1990, pp. 63, 180-81.
107  George Trevelyan: England under Queen Anne, London: Longman, Greens 1931, p. 9.
108  Trevelyan: England under, p. 10. The mercantilist Navigation Acts however came later 
(1651).
109  For example, a failed experiment (1582-87) to privatize the collection of Scottish customs 
pressured burghs facing iscal shortfall to institute novel ways of collecting taxes 
(Goodare and Lynch: “James VI”, pp. 9-10).
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There was also a deeper Scottish foothold in the area. Scots accounted for 
6-7 percent of Helsingør’s population, of which around 30 percent were foreign-
born,110 mainly traders (‘pedlars’). In previous decades these business links had 
transformed into political clout with multi-generational staying power. Scots like 
Richard Wedderburn had served as burgesses, while Alexander Lyall, his son 
Frederick, and David Hanson, all of recent Scottish ancestry, assumed important 
posts. From 1583 the latter two were in charge of the Sound Toll, in addition to 
keeping accounts for building Kronborg castle.111 Their duties brought visibility, 
tax-free privileges and negotiating heft. Wedderburn dealt prominently in malt, 
barley and corn while Lyall the elder had traded accounts for James V, underscor-
ing an organic linkage between trade and policy and connecting the Stuart dynas-
ty directly with Helsingør’s commercial life.
Around the time of James’s trip, this strategic relationship was shifting gear. 
In the 1580s iron ore from eastern Sweden had widened the geographical scope 
of trade, while by 1590 the once-dominant transit trade was evolving into a multi-
purpose commercial relationship, with up to a third of Scottish ships dealing di-
rectly with the Danish monarchy via physical cargos and supplies along with du-
ties. This also introduced complex competitive considerations: greater Scottish 
involvement could interrupt trade patterns involving Germans and other Scan-
dinavians.112 Frequent disputes over trade irregularities in the Danish hinterland 
hinted at such pressures. These changes were unfolding just as overall foreign 
trade was helping, itfully, to pull Scotland out of prolonged recession that was 
prompted by sharp price rises characterizing the late Tudor era.113
With royal accounts chronically short, sea trade crucial to Scottish economic 
prospects, Denmark a pivotal player but source of concern, and Helsingør at the 
beating heart of Baltic commerce, it was an obvious focal point for attention at 
highest levels. And it was arguably a key rationale for an extended foray into Den-
mark (January-April 1590) by James, who was certainly apprised of the history and 
current concerns and evidently given to intervene on behalf of home producers.
CONCLUSIONS
James’s Scandinavian journey is, and presumably will remain, a part mystery; at 
400+ years’ remove we search in vain for a ‘smoking gun’ to explain actions and 
motives of a congenitally luid and complex thinker. That said, setting the trip 
against the broader backdrop, the de ining themes as of 1589, can sharpen our 
110  A. Tønnesen: Helsingørs udenlandske borgere og andre indbyggere i sidste halvdel af det 
16.århundrede med særlig henblik på deres sociale stilling, Copenhagen: University of Co-
penhagen 1967.
111  Riis: Should Auld, pp. 168-71.
112  Riis: Should Auld, pp. 34, 76-7.
113  Goodare and Lynch: “James VI”, p. 9; N.J. Mayhew: “Prices in England, 1170-1750”, Past and 
Present 219, 2013, pp. 4-5.
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perspective on an event frequently but unjusti iably labeled an emotionally driv-
en escapade.
Crisis notwithstanding, overall conditions were comparatively benign, sud-
denly improved, and conducive to personal initiative. James was better posi-
tioned than at any time in his Scottish reign. His autonomy – both real and per-
ceived – re lected multiple breakthroughs: temporary largesse from Elizabeth; 
relief from the sense of foreboding post-1585; completion of sensitive dowry ne-
gotiations, and the happily imminent crown payments from Denmark they her-
alded; his ‘formally married’ status as of end-August and the political headache it 
removed; and a seeming resolution of the convoluted triangular politics of Kirk-
crown-nobility via his Presbyterian alliance. 
A politically more con ident James could embark leaving behind the sem-
blance of a domestic status quo, relying on associates and occasional shipped 
messages. Primarily it was his personal honor which needed boosting, and his 
late-night sailing for Norway (on the heels of storms that nearly sank Anna’s lo-
tilla) amply managed that. And by adding the foreign factor, he could one-up Eli-
zabeth while escaping her lengthy shadow. The notion of James striking while the 
iron was hot suggests itself.
Scotland’s external position, too, stood at a threshold. It sprang not from 
breakthroughs but from policy failures, speci ically the dead-ending of James’s 
early efforts to cultivate Europe’s Catholic world and his pious hopes of driving a 
wedge between France and England. A suddenly formalized Danish link had re-
ignited hopes for the neglected northern, “traditionalist” strand of Scottish re-
lations. This now meant commercial interests, Baltic access and in luence with 
Denmark, for which the Sound Tolls were treated as royal income. This had be-
come a matter of burning domestic import, shown by the attacks against Thirles-
tane in May. 
Aroused by prospects of union with England, cultural diplomacy was also en-
tering the picture. The idea of a post-Reformation, Protestant-led, north-Europe-
an movement of Christian amity, which would dominate James’s later diplomacy, 
was still nascent. Marriage into the Lutheran Danish monarchy was a factor, as 
were his high-pro ile theological engagements in winter 1590. Personal diploma-
cy was necessarily part of the mix – but arguably more as a consequence than a 
cause of the trip.
Throughout, James’s economic straits stood front and center. Dilatory wed-
ding preparations and accompanying resource wastage were unwelcome devel-
opments in an impoverished kingdom. Setting off with bravado and marrying 
elsewhere would de late the embarrassment factor and save faces all around; a 
low-key ceremony abroad would save the crown (and pressured nobles) money; 
lingering dowry details could be resolved, and promised payments secured; and 
economic interests at home stood indirectly to gain in the medium term.
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Assessment of James’s decision making as a complex exercise in reputation 
enhancement thus provides a thread that links a set of personal and narrowly 
political calculations with signi icant exogenous policy concerns. The cumula-
tive strength of such an approach is suggestive but powerfully so, insofar as it al-
lows for consideration of multiple variables and subtle issue linkages that a sup-
ple mind like James was both able and prone to make – especially when it came 
to vital royal matters, as he showed in handling his mother’s execution.114 The 
dramatic non-appearance of Anna sparked a crisis that strengthened his resolve 
rather than weaken it, as might have been the case previously. 
Seeing his trip in this broader light – with James taking possession of incipi-
ent opportunities on multiple fronts – argues for its signi icance as a de ining mo-
ment of his budding adult dynasty. James was emerging as a strategist with an-
ticipatory faculties, and the Scandinavian sojourn provides corroborating, rather 
than countervailing, evidence of this characteristic.
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’Innumerable Others’: Reassessing King James VI/I’s Scandinavian Sojourn
This article addresses the circumstances surrounding a six-month whirlwind 
Scandinavian trip by Scotland’s King James VI in 1589-90, an event that has long 
puzzled historians. The late-autumn sailing to Norway, where he married Anna, 
Princess of Denmark, and their subsequent overwintering in Denmark, gave the 
future King James I of England and Scotland his only foreign experience. While 
traditional analysis has ascribed youthful passion to the young sovereign’s sud-
den departure, evidence presented here suggests the trip as a politically risky but 
shrewdly timed exercise in reputation enhancement for James – the putative yet 
unnamed successor to Queen Elizabeth I on the English throne – and a means of 
bolstering Scotland’s trade and foreign policy prospects at a critical time of na-
tional reorientation.
114  Antonia Fraser notes James’s inconsistent public piety over his mother Mary’s death, whe-
reby “so long as the English crown dangled within his reach, he was prepared to swallow 
the insult to his family and his nation” (Mary, p. 640).
